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We begin with a prediction: At some point in the relatively near 
future, the 2010 Civil Litigation Review Conference (Duke 
Conference)1 will be labeled a failure.2 We can say this with a high 
degree of confidence because the conference’s most notable 
precedent, the National Conference on the Causes of Popular 
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 1. The Civil Litigation Review Conference, sponsored by the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference, was held at Duke University School of Law on May 10–
11, 2010. An impressive group of judges, attorneys, and researchers convened to discuss the 
current state of civil litigation in the federal courts and potential reforms of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
 2. To be clear, this is decidedly not the authors’ view. 
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Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Pound 
Conference), has been called a failure, most recently in a joint report 
of the American College of Trial Lawyers (ACTL) and the Institute 
for the Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS).3 Chief 
Justice Burger called the Pound Conference in 1976 to address a 
number of issues facing the American legal system, including the 
problem of discovery abuse.4 Following the Pound Conference, 
significant revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
proposed, debated, and, in many cases, adopted—decades of what 
Professor Richard L. Marcus has termed “discovery containment.”5 
But as a joint report by the ACTL and IAALS sharply concludes, 
“There is substantial opinion that all of those efforts have 
accomplished little or nothing.”6 
To the list of allegedly failed conferences, one might add the 
1997 conference at Boston College, convened by the Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Committee) to 
focus on cost, delay, and abuses in the pretrial discovery process. 
Expressing the refrain, “Here we go again,” Judge Paul Niemeyer, 
then–Committee Chair, reprised the course of changes in discovery 
rules in the years since the Pound Conference.7 He asserted that 
changes to the discovery rules in 1980, 1983, and 1993 aimed “to 
curtail the expansiveness of discovery, but they have either failed or 
been so diluted as to have little effect.”8 
 
 3. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. 
LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 9–10 (2009), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?
Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4008. 
 4. Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, in THE POUND 
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 295, 318 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. 
Wheeler eds., 1979) (“Substantial criticism has been leveled at the operation of the rules of 
discovery. It is alleged that abuse is widespread, serving to escalate the cost of litigation, to 
delay adjudication unduly and to coerce unfair settlements. Ordeal by pretrial procedures, it has 
been said, awaits the parties to a civil law suit.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 747–
48 (1998) (“[S]ince 1976, proposals for amendment to the rules have generally involved retreats 
from the broadest concept of discovery—in essence to try to contain the genie of broad 
discovery without killing it.”). 
 6. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., supra note 3, at 10. 
 7. Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need 
of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 519–21 (1998). 
 8. Id. at 519. 
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A theme begins to emerge. After further rule amendments in 
2000 and 2006, the complaints are louder than ever. The ACTL-
IAALS joint report stated, for example, 
The existing rules structure does not always lead to early 
identification of the contested issues to be litigated, which often 
leads to a lack of focus in discovery. As a result, discovery can cost 
far too much and can become an end in itself. As one respondent 
noted: “The discovery rules in particular are impractical in that they 
promote full discovery as a value above almost everything else.” 
Electronic discovery, in particular, needs a serious overhaul. It was 
described by one respondent as a “morass.” Another respondent 
stated: “The new rules are a nightmare. The bigger the case the 
more the abuse and the bigger the nightmare.”9 
Again, rule amendments have only resulted in failure. These 
complaints did not fall on deaf ears. At its fall 2008 meeting, the 
Committee voted to proceed with a major conference on the state of 
civil litigation in the federal courts. In support of that conference, the 
Committee—following the path it pursued in 199710—asked the 
Federal Judicial Center (FJC) to conduct an empirical study of civil 
litigation, especially with respect to costs. 
The findings of that study have been reported elsewhere,11 and, 
 
 9. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., supra note 3, at 2. 
 10. See Niemeyer, supra note 7, at 521–22 (“The Committee engaged the Federal Judicial 
Center to study the expense of discovery as well as related questions and to report to the Boston 
Conference.”); see also Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, 
An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule 
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 526 (1998) (“[T]he Advisory Committee on Civil Rules . . . 
asked the FJC to conduct research on discovery as part of a Committee decision to undertake a 
comprehensive examination of that subject.”). 
 11. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-
BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2009) [hereinafter LEE & WILLGING, CASE-BASED 
CIVIL RULES SURVEY], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/
dissurv1.pdf; see also EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2–4 (2010) [hereinafter LEE & 
WILLGING, MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf (“This report, prepared for the Committee’s March 2010 meeting, 
presents multivariate analysis of litigation costs in the closed cases.”); THOMAS E. WILLGING & 
EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN THEIR WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS 
AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter WILLGING & LEE, 
IN THEIR WORDS], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv3.pdf/$file/
costciv3.pdf (“To supplement the multivariate analysis, . . . the Center . . . interview[ed] a 
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given space constraints, we will not attempt in this Article a summary 
drained of nuance and precision. Instead, we propose to survey the 
research, including the FJC reports, prepared for the Duke 
Conference, to define what, exactly, the problem is with civil 
litigation. In Part I, we argue that the problem cannot be simply that 
“litigation is too expensive.”12 Without a normative standard, it is 
impossible to say, in any meaningful way, that litigation is too 
expensive. Moreover, the limited empirical evidence that exists does 
not support the broad statement that litigation costs, in general, are 
out of control. In Part II, we discuss our finding that the stakes in the 
litigation are, empirically, the best predictor of costs. Indeed, in most 
federal civil cases, the costs appear to be proportionate to the 
monetary stakes. If so, the problem is not out-of-control costs 
generally. Nevertheless, there is a desire in some quarters to find 
general solutions to the as-yet-undefined problem of too-expensive 
litigation. The usual suspects are the pretrial discovery rules. But, as 
in Casablanca,13 the usual suspects are often not the perpetrators. In 
Part III, we demonstrate that there is little reason to think that the 
state procedural limits on discovery advanced as models for federal-
rules reform accomplish the goals set out for them. Part IV argues, 
based on empirical research, that there is scant evidence that 
alternative discovery rules would result in lower costs or shorter 
processing times in any predictable fashion. This leads to the larger 
question of whether the pretrial discovery rules are really the cause of 
the perceived problem of costs. Although we do not answer that 
question, we end with the suggestion that before any further 
amendments to the discovery rules are proposed in the name of 
reducing costs, more effort must be made to define the problem that 
such rule amendments are supposed to address.14 Part IV ends, 
 
number of the attorneys who responded to the case-based survey. . . . This report documents 
those interviews, organizing them where possible to track the results of the multivariate 
analyses . . . .”). 
 12. See, e.g., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., PRESERVING 
ACCESS AND IDENTIFYING EXCESS: AREAS OF CONVERGENCE AND CONSENSUS IN THE 2010 
CONFERENCE MATERIALS 5 (2010), available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/
LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/7B6B047956592D3A8525771900011F6A/$File/IAALS, 
Preserving Access and Identifying Excess.pdf (“The collected survey research indicates a very 
strong consensus among nearly all respondent groups that broadly speaking, the civil justice 
system is too expensive.”). 
 13. CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. Pictures 1942). 
 14. This is not to say that discovery-rule amendments tied to other goals might not be 
fruitfully pursued. Specifically, proposed rules for issuing preservation orders or imposing 
sanctions seem designed primarily to bring clarity and predictability to unsettled procedures, 
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fittingly enough, with a call for more empirical research into the costs 
of litigation. 
I.  IS LITIGATION TOO EXPENSIVE? 
When asked, large percentages of practitioners agree that 
“[l]itigation is too expensive.”15 But it is difficult to know what one is 
supposed to make of this finding. In one sense, litigation is almost 
always too expensive. It would often be less expensive to not have the 
dispute in the first place, or, barring that, less costly to find a way to 
resolve the dispute without recourse to the courts.16 But more 
importantly, our empirical research calls into question the view that 
litigation is always expensive.17 We surveyed more than two thousand 
attorneys of record in federal civil cases terminated in the last quarter 
of 2008. We excluded large categories of cases from the study because 
 
not solely to reduce costs. See, e.g., Memorandum from Judge Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory 
Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. 
on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 12–14 (May 
17, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-
2010.pdf (discussing preservation issues on the Committee’s agenda). Moreover, efforts at 
changing attorney behavior might yield gains that rules changes cannot. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
ELEC. DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM, PHASE ONE: OCTOBER 1, 2009–MAY 1, 2010: STATEMENT 
OF PURPOSE AND PREPARATION OF PRINCIPLES 9–10 (2009), available at http://
www.ilcd.uscourts.gov/Statement - Phase One.pdf (“The goal of the Principles is to incentivize 
early and informal information exchange on commonly encountered issues relating to evidence 
preservation and discovery . . . .”); The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference 
Cooperation Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331, 331 (Supp. 2009) (“This Proclamation 
challenges the bar to achieve these goals and refocus litigation toward the substantive resolution 
of legal disputes.”). 
 15. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 12, at 5. 
 16. In another sense, litigation may be too expensive in the aggregate compared to its 
general societal benefits. Most of the criticisms advanced at the Duke Conference, however, 
focused on the micro case-level costs of discovery and litigation, and not this macro level of 
costs. In this Article, therefore, we focus on the claim that the costs in individual cases are too 
high, not the much more difficult-to-assess claim that the costs of all litigation in the United 
States substantially outweigh any possible benefits of that litigation. It should be noted, 
however, that even small cost savings in most cases—as a result of attorney cooperation, for 
example—would represent substantial savings in the aggregate. 
 17. For a discussion of discovery costs and the lack of agreement regarding whether 
discovery limits ameliorate perceived problems, see infra notes 52–66 and accompanying text. 
Empirical sources cited in that discussion support the proposition that litigation costs as a whole 
are not excessive in the typical federal court case. See, e.g., LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST 
SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 6–7 (2010), available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/
LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/33A2682A2D4EF700852577190060E4B5/$File/
Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies.pdf (citing the ACTL-IAALS final report and 
joining these organizations in the call for “fundamental reforms”). 
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they generally do not involve discovery, including prisoner civil rights 
and habeas corpus cases. In cases in which one or more types of 
discovery was reported, we found median litigation costs, including 
attorneys’ fees, of $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants.18 
The median is, of course, the 50th percentile of the distribution of 
reported costs, so half of plaintiffs’ attorneys reported costs under 
$15,000, and half of defendants’ attorneys reported costs under 
$20,000. These medians do not support the claim that the typical case 
in federal court has escalating costs—indeed, these reported costs are 
largely consistent with inflation-adjusted figures from the 1997 FJC 
study.19 Although it would be inappropriate to infer a trend from two 
data points,20 the empirical evidence for out-of-control costs is limited. 
In the context of a push for radical change in the rules of procedure to 
remedy allegedly disproportionate litigation expenses, it seems 
reasonable that the burden of presenting empirical evidence lies with 
the proponents of change. 
At the Duke Conference, the Lawyers for Civil Justice (LCJ) 
presented some evidence of escalating litigation costs. Reporting 
litigation costs from 2000 to 2008 for Fortune 200 companies, the LCJ 
found that outside legal fees and costs had increased from an average 
of $66 million in 2000 to nearly $115 million in 2008.21 For the twenty 
companies reporting costs for the entire time period, the comparable 
figures rose from $66 million in 2000 to $140 million in 2008.22 But 
given its relatively small sample size of two hundred companies, its 
response rate of 10 percent, its short nine-year timeframe, and its lack 
of adjustment for inflation, the value of the study’s findings is limited. 
Even taking the LCJ’s findings at face value, it is difficult to know 
what to make of them. For example, the LCJ also found that, in 2009, 
thirty-six Fortune 200 companies spent a total of $4.1 billion in U.S., 
 
 18. LEE & WILLGING, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY, supra note 11, at 35–36. 
 19. See id. (discussing the differences between the median inflation-adjusted cost of 
litigation and discovery in the 1997 and 2008 studies); see also Willging et al., supra note 10, at 
531, 548 tbl.3 (offering statistics on reported litigation expenses). 
 20. As researchers, we are acutely aware that we do not know very much about discovery 
costs in civil litigation, largely because of the lack of studies, which in turn is the result of the 
inherent difficulties of studying this topic. See Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, 
Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 796–97 (1998) (discussing the 
methodological difficulties in studying discovery). 
 21. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 17, app. 1 at 2–3, 7 fig.3. Of course, 
not every Fortune 200 company reported costs to the LCJ. Id. app. 1 at 4. 
 22. Id. app. 1 at 8–9 & fig.5. 
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outside-litigation costs.23 This finding, however, does not decide the 
issue; many relevant questions remain. In absolute terms, $4.1 billion 
is quite a lot. But is it too much? Relative to what? Moreover, how 
typical are these reported costs for other litigants? 
As empiricists, we are not equipped to answer these largely 
normative questions. That is a matter left to the Committee and other 
policymakers. But empirical research can shed some light on these 
questions. Cost is a numerator in search of a denominator. As our 
study indicates, monetary stakes is a great candidate for that 
denominator. Running with this, we next report our findings with 
respect to the proportionality of discovery costs to stakes. Finally, we 
return to the LCJ report and discuss what it says about the 
relationship between litigation costs and stakes. 
II.  RELATIVE TO STAKES? 
The monetary stakes in a case represent the single best predictor 
of litigation costs in that case. Graphically depicting the data for 
private-firm plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys in the FJC study, 
Figures 1 and 224 present scatter plots of the bivariate relationship 
between monetary stakes25 and reported litigation costs. The plots 
demonstrate a strong linear relationship between stakes and costs; 
variation in the stakes alone explains almost 37 percent of the 
variation in reported costs for plaintiffs’ attorneys and almost 47 
percent of the variation in reported costs for defendants’ attorneys. 
This relationship holds in the multivariate analysis as well. For both 
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys, and after controlling for other 
factors including time to disposition, a 1 percent increase in stakes is 
associated with a 0.25 percent rise in costs.26 In other words, if the 
monetary stakes in a case double, all else being equal, the costs 
 
 23. Id. app. 1 at 8 fig.4. 
 24. See infra Appendix. These figures were created using the Lattice package in R. For 
more information on R, see generally R DEV. CORE TEAM, R: A LANGUAGE AND 
ENVIRONMENT FOR STATISTICAL COMPUTING: REFERENCE INDEX (2010), available at 
http://cran.r-project.org/doc/manuals/refman.pdf, and DEEPAYAN SARKAR, LATTICE: 
MULTIVARIATE DATA VISUALIZATION WITH R (2008). 
 25. Respondents were asked to estimate, in dollars, the best and worst “likely” outcomes 
from the point of view of their clients. Stakes were then calculated as the “spread” between 
these two figures. See LEE & WILLGING, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY, supra note 11, at 
41–42 (describing in detail the variables used). For a reprint of the questions used, see id. app. C 
at 94–95. 
 26. LEE & WILLGING, MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, supra note 11, at 5, 7. 
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increase by 25 percent. The complete multivariate models explain 
approximately 62 percent of the variation in plaintiffs’ attorneys’ 
reported costs and 76 percent of the variation in defendants’ 
attorneys’ reported costs.27 Thus, stakes alone account for about 60 
percent of the explained variation in the complete models. In a very 
real sense, there are stakes, and then there is everything else. 
In our interviews, we found that many practitioners emphasize 
the overarching importance of monetary stakes when deciding on 
discovery and pretrial practices that are likely to increase litigation 
costs. A number of interview subjects indicated that clients 
understand the relationship between stakes and costs, too. The 
following statements are illustrative: 
 
• “Companies are willing to invest more in cases where the stakes 
are . . . high.” 
• “Even the client expects an attorney to invest more time in high 
stakes cases.” 
• “One has to take into account the possibility of being enjoined 
from selling a product, which increases the stakes.” 
• “If there’s a lot of money involved, parties dig in their heels and 
litigate every little thing.” 
• “Stakes make a difference in that clients are willing to pay and 
more likely to dig deeper into discovery.”28 
 
Our findings indicate that the monetary stakes in the litigation 
represent the primary cost driver in most civil litigation. This very 
robust relationship between stakes and costs leads directly to the 
much-debated question of proportionality. Since it was amended in 
1983, Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) has directed courts to limit discovery if 
they determine that “the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the 
case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of 
the discovery in resolving the issues.”29 This proportionality principle 
is somewhat broader than monetary stakes but requires, at minimum, 
that judges and parties consider both the “amount in controversy” 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. WILLGING & LEE, IN THEIR WORDS, supra note 11, at 5–6 (alteration in original). 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
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and the value of the “issues at stake in the action” in relation to the 
burden or cost of proposed discovery. 
The rule itself, however, is unclear as to the proper ratio of 
discovery costs to stakes. The Committee commentary is also not 
terribly instructive. Professor Arthur Miller, Reporter to the 
Committee in 1983, described disproportionate discovery with this 
example: “In a $10,000 damage case, spending $50,000 on discovery is 
disproportionate.”30 It seems beyond cavil that a five-to-one ratio of 
costs to stakes is disproportionate; the much more interesting case is a 
ratio of one to five. Is that proportionate? As is usually true, it 
depends. As Miller noted, “Everybody understands you can have a 
case where the values at stake transcend the economics of the case, so 
this is not a pure dollar test.”31 Nor, it would seem, does the rule call 
for a straightforward ratio. 
Lawyers and academic commentators often opine that judges 
infrequently invoke the proportionality principle.32 But if the parties 
limit their requests with an eye toward stakes, or if they negotiate to 
modify disproportionate requests, judges will have little or no need to 
invoke the rule. Our research indicates that disproportionate 
discovery may be less of a problem than critics of the Federal Rules 
often asseverate. In the survey, we asked respondents to rate the 
relationship of the discovery costs in a particular closed case to the 
client’s stakes in the litigation. They were asked to rate 
proportionality on a seven-point scale, “with [one] being too little, 
[four] being just the right amount, and [seven] being too much.”33 A 
majority of respondents—59 percent of plaintiffs’ attorneys and 57 
percent of defendants’ attorneys—answered that the costs of 
discovery were “just the right amount” compared to the stakes.34 
About one in four respondents—23 percent of plaintiffs’ attorneys 
and 27 percent of defendants’ attorneys—rated their client’s costs at 
 
 30. ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND 
LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 32 (1984). 
 31. Id. at 33. 
 32. See, e.g., KIRSTEN BARRETT, RHODA COHEN & JOHN HALL, MATHEMATICA POLICY 
RESEARCH, INC., ACTL CIVIL LITIGATION SURVEY, FINAL REPORT 41 (2008) (finding that 
“76.8% of Fellows agree that judges do not invoke Rule 26(b)(2)(C) on their own initiative”). 
 33. LEE & WILLGING, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY, supra note 11, at 28 & fig.14. 
The unweighted sample sizes were 1,184 for plaintiffs’ attorneys and 1,193 for defendants’ 
attorneys. 
 34. Id. at 27–28 & fig.13. 
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five or higher, but ratings of six or seven were relatively rare.35 Thus, 
relatively few respondents believed that discovery costs had been 
disproportionate in those particular cases.36 More than three-quarters 
of the responses, in fact, clustered between three and five on the 
seven-point scale.37 
In our interviews, attorneys pointed out mechanisms they use to 
keep costs proportionate to stakes. Some simply kept the stakes in 
mind: “[O]ne always tailors the amount of discovery to the stakes. 
The difference between a $50,000 case and a $500,000 case is always 
on one’s mind.”38 Others followed the limits of a scheduling order: “I 
go as far as the law will allow. There are time constraints . . . .”39 
Attorneys appear to use these and other mechanisms to adjust costs 
to conform to the stakes of the litigation.40 These mechanisms, in turn, 
may help explain why the majority of attorneys surveyed concluded 
not only that the costs in their case were “just the right amount” in 
relation to their clients’ stakes but also that they obtained the right 
amount of information.41 
This case-based finding that costs are generally proportionate to 
stakes is again at odds with the views expressed by other participants 
at the Duke Conference. The IAALS-ACTL survey found that 
ACTL fellows overwhelmingly believe that the costs of litigation are 
not proportionate to the value of a case. In versions of the survey 
administered to the members of the American Bar Association 
(ABA) Section of Litigation and the National Employment Lawyers 
Association (NELA), the proportionality question was split into one 
question asking whether litigation costs are proportionate to the 
value of large cases and one asking whether the costs are 
proportionate to the value of small cases. Respondents to these 
 
 35. Id. at 28. 
 36. The 1997 FJC study found that 54 percent of all respondents reported that discovery 
expenses in the closed case were “about right” in relation to stakes, with 15 percent reporting 
that such expenses were “high” and 20 percent reporting that they were “low.” Eleven percent 
did not express an opinion. Willging et al., supra note 10, at 531, 550–51 & tbl.8. 
 37. Id. 
 38. WILLGING & LEE, IN THEIR WORDS, supra note 11, at 5. 
 39. Id. at 22. 
 40. For a more complete discussion of attorney responses to the question “How much 
discovery is enough?,” see id. at 21–24. 
 41. See LEE & WILLGING, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY, supra note 11, at 27 & 
fig.13 (reporting that 56.6 percent of plaintiffs’ attorneys and 66.8 percent of defendants’ 
attorneys reported that the discovery in their cases had resulted in “just the right amount” of 
information). 
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questions expressed the general view that litigation costs are 
disproportionate to the value of small cases but not necessarily 
disproportionate to the value of large cases.42 
These impressionistic findings are difficult to square with our 
case-based survey findings. Perhaps the members of the ACTL, ABA 
Section of Litigation, and NELA have had markedly different 
experiences than the randomly selected attorneys surveyed by the 
FJC. Perhaps the responses in the more impressionistic surveys are 
affected by well-known cognitive biases, such as availability and 
recall—in other words, the tendency of respondents to call to mind 
problematic cases when asked a general question.43 Whatever the 
explanation for these differences, the case-based surveys provide 
empirical evidence of greater proportionality in the relationship of 
discovery costs to stakes than one would predict based on the 
complaints raised by critics of the Federal Rules.44 
But what of the $4.1 billion in outside legal costs reported by the 
LCJ? Could costs that high be considered proportionate to anything? 
The LCJ report itself does not address the stakes in the underlying 
cases, but it does present some information about litigation costs for 
outside counsel as a percentage of companies’ U.S. revenues. Without 
knowing more about the confidential underlying data, it is difficult to 
know exactly how to interpret the numbers. But Figure 8 in that 
report, which excludes outliers, seems informative. For companies in 
sectors other than health care and insurance, from 2000 to 2008, 
outside litigation costs as a share of U.S. revenues were relatively 
constant, hovering around 0.3 percent.45 In other words, for the 
reporting Fortune 200 companies in these sectors, outside litigation 
costs consumed about one in every three hundred dollars of total U.S. 
revenues. This percentage varied only between 0.27 percent and 0.4 
 
 42. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY 
SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 10–11 & fig.11 (2010), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv2.pdf/$file/costciv2.pdf. 
 43. There is a lengthy literature on the role of heuristics in cognition. For an application of 
this literature in the legal literature, which applies an availability heuristic to risk perception, 
see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability Heuristic and 
Cross-Cultural Risk Perception, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 87–89 (2005). For the classic essay on 
availability heuristics, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for 
Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973). 
 44. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
 45. See LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 17, app. 1 at 11, 12 fig.8 (“[A]ll 
other industries report an average of 0.33 percent of revenue.”). 
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percent over the time period and was at almost exactly the same level 
in 2000 as in 2008.46 Health care and insurance companies, on the 
other hand, reported increasing percentages of revenues consumed by 
litigation, from 0.45 percent in 2000 to 1.15 percent in 2008, with a 
particularly sharp increase between 2004 and 2005.47 Even so, the 2008 
figure for health care and insurance enterprises represents about one 
in every one hundred dollars of U.S. revenues consumed by outside 
litigation costs. 
It is not our place to say whether one in every one hundred—or 
every three hundred—dollars of revenues is a disproportionate 
amount for the largest U.S. companies to spend on litigation. Once 
again, the problem is the lack of a normative standard for evaluating 
the cost data. But the question should be put to the authors of the 
LCJ report to specify what the appropriate outlay for litigation would 
be, if, as the LCJ argues, the reported costs are too high. The answer 
would be informative. 
III.  MODELS FOR REFORM? 
Given the lack of empirical evidence for a cost problem, it should 
not be surprising that the empirical support for some of the solutions 
put forward by rule critics is also pretty weak. The IAALS, for 
example, puts forward the limits on discovery in the Arizona and 
Oregon state-court procedures as models for the Committee to 
consider.48 But the IAALS studies themselves suggest that neither of 
these systems accomplishes the goals that the IAALS sets out for 
them. In both systems, for example, attorney respondents indicate 
that litigation in the state courts is still too expensive, despite the 
limits on discovery. In Arizona, 84 percent of respondents agreed 
 
 46. Id. app. 1 at 12 fig.8. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., SURVEY OF THE 
ARIZONA BENCH & BAR ON THE ARIZONA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26–27, 29–42 (2010) 
[hereinafter INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., THE ARIZONA RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE] (discussing the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure’s presumptive limits on 
discovery); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., SURVEY OF THE OREGON 
BENCH & BAR ON THE OREGON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 31–43 (2010) [hereinafter INST. 
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., THE OREGON RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE] (discussing restrictions on discovery under the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure). 
Oregon, in addition, adheres to a form of fact pleading, which the IAALS also supports. See 
Rebecca Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton, Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 245, 266–67 (2010) (“The Oregon Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed 
the state’s commitment to fact pleading.”). 
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with the statement that civil justice in Arizona superior court is “too 
expensive”;49 in Oregon, 79 percent of respondents agreed that civil 
justice in Oregon circuit court is “too expensive.”50 Somewhat oddly, 
the IAALS cites these state figures in a document calling for reform 
of the Federal Rules.51 That experienced practitioners in these model 
systems think civil justice is too expensive despite the discovery limits, 
however, undercuts the argument that adopting similar rules would 
reduce the perceived unnecessary expenses in federal court litigation. 
More tellingly, however, Arizona and Oregon practitioners seem 
rather cool to the purported advantages of limited discovery. This is 
not to say that limits on discovery do not have any effect. For 
example, when asked about the potential benefits of Arizona’s 
presumptive limits on discovery as a whole, 64 percent of respondents 
agreed that the limits focused discovery, and 58 percent agreed that 
the limits actually reduced the volume of discovery.52 With respect to 
whether the presumptive limits make costs more predictable or 
reduce costs, time to disposition, or the threat of forced settlement, 
however, opinions were mixed, or even negative. Forty-seven percent 
of respondents agreed that the presumptive limits reduced costs, but 
44 percent disagreed—within the reported margin of error of 3.5 
percent.53 In other words, not even a statistically significant plurality 
of surveyed Arizona practitioners agreed that the Arizona discovery 
limits reduce costs. Furthermore, 53 percent disagreed that the limits 
reduce time to disposition, and 55 percent disagreed both that the 
limits make costs more predictable and that they reduce the threat of 
forced settlement.54 This does not make a very strong case for reform 
based on the Arizona model. 
 
 49. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., THE ARIZONA RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 48, at 44 & fig.44. 
 50. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., THE OREGON RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 48, at 54 & fig.51. 
 51. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 12, at 4–5 
(grouping the Oregon and Arizona surveys with the ACTL, ABA Section of Litigation, and 
NELA surveys). 
 52. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., THE ARIZONA RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 48, at 37 & fig.35. This latter advantage is somewhat 
tautological. It would be strange if respondents did not agree that limits on discovery actually 
limit discovery. Interestingly, 35 percent of respondents expressed just this view. Id. 
 53. See id. at 7, 37 & fig.35 (providing a 95 percent confidence level at plus or minus 3.54 
percent for the entire sample of 767 valid responses). 
 54. Id. at 37 & fig.35. 
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Perhaps one could argue in rebuttal that Arizona practitioners 
with federal-court experience prefer state court to federal court, thus 
indicating the superiority of state courts and their limited discovery. 
Almost half of the attorney respondents with federal-court 
experience—49 percent—expressed a preference for Arizona state 
court over federal court, whereas only 25 percent expressed a 
preference for federal court.55 A “two-to-one ratio”56 is a large margin 
in favor of the Arizona state courts. But the report’s assertion that 
“nearly three-quarters of respondents either prefer the state forum or 
have no preference” is a bit much.57 Although about half of attorney 
respondents with federal-court experience prefer state courts, about 
half either prefer federal court or have no preference. One can spin 
these results, but this is not a knockdown case for reform.58 
The results of the Oregon survey are very similar. The Oregon 
discovery limits as a whole fare about as well as the Arizona limits. 
Again, a majority of respondents—64 percent—agreed that the limits 
on discovery reduce the volume of discovery.59 Similarly, 51 percent 
agreed that the limits focus discovery, whereas only 41 percent 
disagreed.60 But there is simply no agreement among respondents that 
the limits make costs more predictable or that they reduce costs, time 
to disposition, or the threat of forced settlement. Forty-three percent 
agreed that the limits make costs more predictable, but 48 percent 
disagreed.61 Forty-six percent of respondents agreed that the limits 
 
 55. Id. at 12 fig.6. 
 56. Id. at 12. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Moreover, there are many reasons why attorneys may prefer one forum to another; 
procedural rules are just one—and probably not the most important one. In a study of choice of 
forum in class action litigation, for example, 78 percent of plaintiffs’ attorneys identified the 
source of the claims (state law) as a reason for filing in state court. Only 28 percent identified 
the favorableness of discovery rules, and only 31 percent identified lower costs of litigation. 
Respondents could, however, identify more than one reason for filing in a particular forum. See 
THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AN EMPIRICAL 
EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS’ CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 18 tbl.2 
(2005). Without knowing more about why attorneys prefer the state courts to federal courts, it is 
not clear what one should conclude from this finding with respect to procedural rules. The 
IAALS report includes a long list of reasons why respondents preferred the state forum, but 
these are not given particular weights. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. 
LEGAL SYS., THE ARIZONA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 48, at 13. 
 59.  INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., THE OREGON RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 48, at 41 fig.33. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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reduce costs, but 45 percent disagreed that they did so.62 Forty-five 
percent agreed that the limits reduce time to disposition, but 46 
percent disagreed.63 And 42 percent agreed that the limits reduce the 
threat of forced settlement, but 44 percent disagreed.64 
Moreover, the Oregon attorneys with federal-court experience 
do not show much of a preference for state court. Forty-three percent 
of respondents indicated a preference for state court, and 37 percent 
expressed a preference for federal court65—a difference of only six 
percentage points in a study with a reported margin of error of 4.5 
percent for the entire sample, of which these percentages represent a 
subset. We doubt that this result is statistically significant, and the 
report does not say. And although the report asserts that “[a]lmost 
two-thirds of respondents either prefer the state forum or have no 
preference,”66 it is also true that almost 60 percent prefer federal court 
or had no preference. 
In short, Arizona and Oregon attorneys, in evaluations based on 
their experience, revealed the shortcomings of limits on discovery as a 
solution to the perceived problems of cost and delay. The responses 
provided by these attorneys simply do not provide much support for 
adopting such rules at the federal level. 
IV.  RUSH TO JUDGMENT? 
A careful review of the empirical research prepared for the Duke 
Conference begs the question with which we began—what, exactly, is 
the problem to be solved? The usual suspect, at least since the 1976 
Pound Conference, has been pretrial discovery costs. But empirical 
research does not support the charge. 
Empirical research has not provided support for the prevailing 
view that discovery costs are necessarily the major cost driver in 
litigation. The 2009 FJC case-based study found that the median 
percentage of total litigation costs accounted for by discovery was 20 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. The Oregon report also notes a number of commonly held complaints about the 
Oregon discovery limits that are worth considering. Almost 40 percent of respondents 
complained that the complete absence of interrogatories in Oregon “diminishe[d] counsel’s 
ability to prepare for trial,” and “a majority indicated that the absence of expert discovery 
decreases counsel’s ability to prepare for trial.” Id. at 2. 
 65. Id. at 12 fig.6. 
 66. Id. at 12. 
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percent for plaintiffs’ attorneys and 27 percent for defendants’ 
attorneys.67 Although that figure has struck some as low—a claim to 
which we will turn shortly—the point to remember is that the FJC 
estimate is generally consistent with previous studies. The Columbia 
Project study from the 1960s estimated that discovery accounted for 
between 19 and 36 percent of litigation costs, depending on whether a 
party was a requesting or requesting-and-producing party.68 The Civil 
Litigation Research Project in the 1970s found that, in the ordinary 
case, 16.7 percent of attorney time, a proxy for cost, was spent on 
discovery.69 And in the 1990s, the RAND Corporation found that 
“lawyer work hours on discovery are zero for 38 percent of general 
civil cases, and low for the majority of cases,” making discovery “not 
a pervasive litigation cost problem for the majority of cases.”70 
Focusing on cases lasting longer than 270 days, RAND found that 
postfiling discovery consumed a little over one-third (36 percent) of 
attorney work hours.71 The highest estimate of the percentage of total 
cost associated with discovery was that reported in the 1997 FJC 
study—a median estimate of 50 percent for both plaintiffs’ and 
defendants’ attorneys.72 
The LCJ report presented at the Duke Conference may also 
shed some light on the percentage of total litigation costs allocated to 
discovery in “major cases,” which that study defines as cases with 
attorneys’ fees exceeding $250,000.73 Figure 11 in that report provides 
the average discovery costs, for at least some corporations, for major 
cases closed from 2004 to 2008.74 Figure 10 provides the average 
outside legal fees for major cases closed during the same years. 
Unfortunately, the number of corporations included in the two 
figures is not the same, making it impossible to draw any meaningful 
 
 67. LEE & WILLGING, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY, supra note 11, at 38–39 tbls.6 
& 7. 
 68. WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 180 
tbl.43 (1968). 
 69. David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel B. 
Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 91 tbl.3 (1983). 
 70. James S. Kakalik, Deborah R. Hensler, Daniel F. McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas 
M. Pace & Mary E. Vaiana, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT: 
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA, at xx (1998). 
 71. Id. at xxi tbl.S.2. 
 72. Willging et al., supra note 10, at 548 tbl.4. 
 73. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 17, app. 1 at 13–14. 
 74. Id. app. 1 at 15 fig.11. Note that for 2006 and 2007, the number of responding 
corporations is only four. 
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comparisons. It is impossible, for example, to assess how the average 
discovery costs for major cases closed in 2008 for twenty reporting 
corporations—$621,880—relate to the average outside legal fees for 
major cases closed in 2008 for thirty reporting corporations—
$2,019,248.75 But with that caveat, simply dividing the average 
discovery costs per major case closed in 2008 by the average outside 
legal fees per major case closed that year yields an estimate of 
discovery costs as a share of outside legal fees of 30.8 percent. That is 
surprisingly close to the 2009 FJC report’s figure for defendants’ 
attorneys (a median of 27 percent) and is well within the bounds of 
previous empirical research. Moreover, because this estimate does 
not appear to include in-house legal costs or other litigation costs 
beyond legal fees in the denominator, it may actually overstate the 
percentage of costs associated with discovery.76 
The empirical studies of discovery costs, in short, indicate that in 
the typical case—and perhaps even in the typical major case, although 
that data is very limited—one should expect discovery costs to 
account for more than 20 percent, on the lower end, and maybe, on 
the higher end, about half of the total litigation costs. There will be 
some more discovery-heavy cases, of course, but 20 to 50 percent is 
what we would expect in a typical case. 
The impressionistic studies provide a very different picture, 
however. In the ACTL, ABA Section of Litigation, and NELA 
surveys, the median estimate of the percentage of litigation costs 
attributable to discovery in cases not going to trial was 70 percent.77 
Again, this figure is rather hard to square with the other studies. The 
likely reason for the disparity is cognitive bias—respondents are 
providing answers based on problematic cases or on what can be 
described as the conventional wisdom.78 Although it is plausible that 
discovery costs account for 70 percent of total litigation costs in some 
cases, the weight of empirical evidence indicates that it is unlikely to 
reach 70 percent in many cases. In the October 2009 FJC report, the 
95th percentile for the reported percentage of litigation costs incurred 
in discovery was 80 percent for both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ 
 
 75. Id. app. 1 at 14–15 figs.10 & 11. 
 76. The report itself states, however, that its numbers “understate . . . discovery costs, 
because many discovery costs may go unmeasured and unreported.” Id. app. 1 at 15. 
 77. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 12, at 13. 
 78. For a discussion of the role of heuristics in cognition, see supra note 43 and 
accompanying text. 
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attorneys.79 Additional analysis of that data shows that, in cases with 
any reported discovery event, only 10 percent of respondents 
reported that discovery costs were as much as 70 percent of total 
costs. This is the result of only one study, of course, but 10 percent of 
cases with discovery as a share of total costs as high as 70 percent is 
not really typical of federal cases in general. 
If one frames the problem as discovery costs accounting for 70 
percent of litigation costs in the typical case, then there is little 
empirical evidence that any such problem exists on a wide-scale basis. 
Only the impressionistic survey responses support the view that this is 
a problem in the typical federal case. There is nothing else, unless one 
wants to credit survey responses stating that discovery is “too 
expensive.”80 
Has the case for wide-ranging reform of the discovery rules been 
made? The argument is being made insistently, for sure. But, as 
District Judge Lee Rosenthal, chair of the Judicial Conference 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and former chair of 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, recently observed, “Since 
their inception in 1938, the rules of discovery have been revised with 
what some view as distressing frequency. And yet the rulemakers 
continue to hear that the rules are inadequate to control discovery 
costs and burdens.”81 The critics of the Federal Rules believe that the 
long-term project, arguably initiated with the Pound Conference, to 
devise cost-controlling discovery rules has failed.82 There are, 
however, two ways in which the project may have failed. On the one 
hand, the project may not have gone far enough, largely because the 
potential for gamesmanship inherent in the system makes it difficult 
to achieve perfection or even “excellence.”83 Attorneys will exploit 
the rules and the rulemaking process to seek advantages over their 
 
 79. LEE & WILLGING, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY, supra note 11, at 38–39 tbls.6 
& 7. 
 80. See, e.g., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 12, at 14 
(“At least 70% of respondents . . . agreed that discovery in general is too expensive.”). 
 81. Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate: ’Twixt the Cup 
and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 228 (2010). 
 82. See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: 
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
2067, 2070 (1989) (“Not only is perfection [in procedural rulemaking] impossible, but even 
excellence is unstable, especially so in a system dependent on the adversary tradition, because of 
changing circumstances and the corrosive effect of perpetual exploration and exploitation of 
systemic weaknesses by adversaries.”). 
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adversaries, to the detriment of the system and society as a whole.84 
Thus, only radical changes can make the strategic exploitation of the 
rules impossible. Yet radical change appears unlikely to survive the 
rulemaking process. 
On the other hand, the project may have failed to reduce costs 
because it does not address the actual drivers of cost. Perhaps the 
procedural reforms have not reduced the purportedly high costs of 
litigation because those costs have a source other than the Federal 
Rules themselves. Professor Charles Silver argued just that in an 
article published in 2002: “[P]rocedural reforms have not reduced 
[litigation] costs because adjudicatory procedures are not generating 
these costs.”85 “Costs,” he continues, “instead reflect the need to 
figure out how much claims are worth and the difficulty of bargaining, 
which in turn reflect, respectively, properties of claims and of 
relationships between claimants and respondents. Empirical studies 
support this idea.”86 Our study also supports Silver’s argument. The 
monetary stakes in litigation best predict the costs.87 Claims that are 
worth more also cost more to litigate, primarily because the parties 
will spend more when more is at stake. It seems difficult to believe 
that any but radical rule changes could affect this basic pattern. 
But other properties of claims impact costs in ways that rule 
changes are unlikely to affect.88 Factual complexity, for example, is 
associated with higher costs, probably because it makes it harder for 
the parties to uncover the evidence necessary to price claims and 
bargain toward settlement. Respondents in the 2009 FJC case-based 
survey rated the factual complexity of the closed case on a seven-
point scale, with one being “[n]ot complex at all,” four being 
“[a]verage complexity,” and seven being “[e]xtremely complex.”89 
Even controlling for other factors, each one-unit increase in this 
subjective scale of factual complexity was associated with an 11 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2074 (2002). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See supra Part II. 
 88. Interestingly, we find that, in general, nature-of-suit categories of cases do not affect 
costs, though there are a few notable exceptions. We find that, once other factors are controlled 
for, tort cases are less costly for plaintiffs and that intellectual property cases are much more 
expensive for defendants than other kinds of cases. But the other nature-of-suit categories are 
no more or less costly, on a consistent basis, than the baseline. LEE & WILLGING, 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, supra note 11, at 6, 8. 
 89. LEE & WILLGING, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY, supra note 11, app. C at 96. 
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percent increase in costs for plaintiffs and a 13 percent increase in 
costs for defendants.90 The most complex cases, in short, are going to 
have higher costs than the least complex cases, even after one 
controls for other factors related to the Federal Rules. 
Contention among the parties also increases costs, at least for 
defendants. Respondents were asked to rate the contentiousness 
between the parties on a seven-point scale, with one being “[n]ot 
contentious at all,” four being “[a]verage contentiousness,” and seven 
being “[e]xtremely contentious.”91 All else being equal, defendants 
reported an 8 percent increase in costs for each one-unit increase in 
contentiousness.92 This suggests that difficulties in litigating and 
bargaining that result from the relationship between the parties can 
generate much higher costs than other factors can explain. 
The economics of the legal practice also affect costs in a way not 
directly related to specific procedural reforms. In general, the larger 
the law firm handling the case—as measured by the number of 
attorneys—the higher the costs, even after controlling for factors such 
as stakes, complexity, and levels of discovery. Using a solo 
practitioner as the baseline and holding everything else constant, 
costs for a firm of more than five hundred attorneys would be more 
than double for both defendants (156 percent higher) and plaintiffs 
(109 percent higher).93 Hourly billing was also associated with higher 
costs for plaintiffs.94 Our interview subjects said a number of 
interesting things on this front. One put it quite graphically: “You 
have to feed the tiger first before defendants will settle a case.”95 
This is not to say that pretrial discovery does not explain some of 
the variation in costs—it does. But once one accounts for nonrules 
factors, the effects of discovery on costs are much more mixed than 
one might expect based on the criticisms of the Federal Rules. The 
bête noire of the critics—electronic discovery—shows a very 
 
 90. LEE & WILLGING, MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, supra note 11, at 6–7. 
 91. LEE & WILLGING, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY, supra note 11, app. C at 96. 
 92. LEE & WILLGING, MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, supra note 11, at 7. 
 93. Id. at 6, 8. 
 94. Id. at 6. Attorneys representing plaintiffs in the closed cases who reported using hourly 
billing reported costs 25 percent higher than other attorneys, all else being equal. There were so 
few defendants’ attorneys using alternative fee arrangements that we cannot say what the 
effects of hourly billing are on defendants’ costs. Fewer than 5 percent of defendants’-attorney 
respondents reported using a billing method other than hourly billing. Id. at 8. 
 95. WILLGING & LEE, IN THEIR WORDS, supra note 11, at 10 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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interesting pattern. All else being equal, a request by plaintiffs for 
production of electronically stored information (ESI) appears to be 
associated with higher costs for those plaintiffs, regardless of whether 
the plaintiff is also a producing party. The costs for plaintiffs who 
were requesting-only parties with respect to ESI were approximately 
37 percent higher than for plaintiffs in cases without electronic 
discovery, and costs for plaintiffs both requesting and producing ESI 
were 48 percent higher than for plaintiffs in cases without electronic 
discovery.96 For defendants, however, producing-only and requesting-
only parties did not have higher costs, after controlling for other 
factors, than parties in cases without electronic discovery.97 But in 
cases in which the defendant was both a producing and requesting 
party with respect to ESI, costs were approximately 17 percent higher 
than in cases without electronic discovery.98 
The results for plaintiffs make a great deal of sense. The 
requesting plaintiff incurs higher costs as a result of electronic 
discovery. But how could it be that defendants producing ESI did not 
have consistently higher costs, once other factors were accounted for? 
The answer, it appears, is that the costs of producing ESI are highly 
variable from respondent to respondent.99 In other words, defendants 
producing ESI do not consistently face higher costs than similarly 
situated defendants in cases without electronic discovery. Factors 
internal to the company and its information systems, not the Federal 
Rules, are responsible for some of these costs.100 
With that said, however, it is important to note that electronic-
discovery disputes are costly when they occur.101 All else being equal, 
for plaintiffs and defendants alike, each reported type of dispute over 
 
 96. LEE & WILLGING, MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, supra note 11, at 5. Not surprisingly, 
very few plaintiffs’ attorneys reported that their clients were producing-only parties. Id. 
 97. Id. at 7. 
 98. Id. 
 99. This finding is consistent with those of the RAND study, which was also presented at 
the Duke Conference. Email from Nicholas M. Pace, Behavioral/Soc. Scientist, RAND Corp., 
to Thomas E. Willging, Senior Researcher, Fed. Judicial Ctr. (June 28, 2010, 16:12 EDT) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). For a video of Mr. Pace’s presentation at the Duke Conference, 
see Civil Litigation Conference, DUKE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW (May 10, 2010), http://www.law.
duke.edu/webcast (follow “Civil Litigation Conference – 2” hyperlink). 
 100. See supra note 99. 
 101. This is not as often as some might believe. LEE & WILLGING, CASE-BASED CIVIL 
RULES SURVEY, supra note 11, at 24 (reporting that the overwhelming majority of plaintiffs’ 
and defendants’ attorneys—72.4 percent and 78.3 percent, respectively—reported that no 
disputes had occurred in the closed case). 
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ESI was associated with a 10 percent increase in costs.102 To the extent 
that rule changes make such disputes less common or less costly to 
resolve, the Committee would potentially provide a great deal of cost 
savings for parties. 
Finally, a ruling on summary judgment adds considerably to the 
cost of litigation for both plaintiffs and defendants. All else being 
equal, including duration, summary judgment added 24 percent to 
plaintiffs’ costs and 22 percent to defendants’ costs.103 Though the 
procedures for ruling on summary judgment are rule based, the costs 
are associated with a ruling on a motion. Thus, the costs seem to be, 
in substantial part, a product of a party’s decision to move for 
summary judgment and not of the procedural mechanics of Rule 56.104 
Moreover, the participants in the Duke Conference did not entertain 
any serious suggestions for reforming, let alone eliminating, summary 
judgment procedures. 
Despite the findings of the FJC study, however, there is still 
much to learn about the costs of litigation. The Duke Conference’s 
focus on empirical research may inspire additional work in this area. 
No one knows better than us the inherent difficulties of studying the 
costs of litigation. But given that this will likely continue to be an area 
of interest to the judiciary for many years to come, there is a need for 
more information to inform the policy debate. 
CONCLUSION 
The FJC study found that discovery and overall litigation costs 
were largely proportionate to stakes, and that the stakes in a case 
were the single best predictor of overall costs. In general, litigation 
costs were lower than one might have expected, given what Professor 
Linda S. Mullenix has called “[t]he [p]ervasive [m]yth of [p]ervasive 
[d]iscovery [a]buse.”105 Participants in the Duke Conference—and 
many others—will disagree with the myth characterization. But this 
raises its own questions. First, why is this belief so enduring, when it 
 
 102. LEE & WILLGING, MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, supra note 11, at 5, 7. 
 103. Id. at 6, 8. 
 104. Many plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that summary judgment practice is not tethered by the 
constraints of Rule 56(c)(2) that there be “no genuine issue as to any material fact.” See 
WILLGING & LEE, IN THEIR WORDS, supra note 11, at 29–31 (quoting plaintiffs’ attorneys who 
argue that summary judgment is overused). 
 105. Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 
B.C. L. REV. 683 (1998). 
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has never been supported by a single empirical study of costs, as 
opposed to beliefs about costs? Second, have the critics of the Federal 
Rules carried their burden of persuasion? Is there really a need for 
sweeping, radical procedural reforms, as opposed to more-focused 
reforms of particular federal rules? 
Although we do not endorse Professor Silver’s conclusion, we 
think that it deserves the consideration of the rulemakers. His 
argument is an increasingly plausible alternative to the widespread 
belief that the procedural reforms enacted since the Pound 
Conference have failed to reduce costs. Perhaps the procedures that 
have been reformed were not causing the problem in the first place. 
Instead of pursuing sweeping, radical reforms of the pretrial discovery 
rules, perhaps it would be more appropriate to pursue more-focused 
reforms of particularly knotty issues (such as preservation duties with 
respect to ESI) and additional, credible research on the relationship 
between pretrial discovery and litigation costs. 
Otherwise, we may simply find ourselves considering an endless 
litany of complaints about a problem that cannot be pinned down 
empirically and that never seems to improve regardless of what steps 
are taken. In other words, we might find ourselves, again, right back 
where the Pound Conference set off almost four decades ago. Déjà 
vu, indeed. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1. Relationship Between Monetary Stakes and Total Litigation 
Costs, Private-Firm Plaintiffs’ Attorneys (N=828) 
 
Figure 2. Relationship Between Monetary Stakes and Total Litigation 
Costs, Private-Firm Defendants’ Attorneys (N=715) 
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